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Abstract
Prediction markets are specific financial markets designed to produce
forecasts of future events, such as political election outcomes or economic
policy decisions. Empirical studies have exhibited over the years the sig-
nificant accuracy of these anticipations, which tends to give credit to the
efficicent market hypothesis advocated by the literature. However the
latter relies theoretically on rational behaviors, in sharp contrast with
traders’ actions observed on most prediction markets. Indeed, an impor-
tant fraction of participants are subject to several judgement bias. Based
on Ottaviani and Sorensen’s (2010) approach, we develop a framework
that allows to introduce these biased traders and to study the conse-
quences on the equilibrium properties.
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1 Introduction
Prediction markets, sometimes referred as “information markets” or “event fu-
tures”, are particular financial markets where participants trade contracts whose
payoff depends on the realization of unknown future events. The latter can be
presidential or congressional elections, economic policy decisions (will the FED
increase or decrease its interest rates for instance), but also sport events or even
box-office figures. Typical contracts are “winner-takes-all” contracts1, paying
out a fixed amount in case of a specific event (e.g. the Republican candidate wins
the US presidential election), and zero otherwise. These markets are primarily
designed to produce forecasts, since prices on financial markets are assumed to
aggregate information2. The final intention is to test for the different efficient
market hypotheses introduced by Fama (1970) and stating that if traders are
rational, prices convey all the relevant information about the object of trade. In
this case, the price of an Arrow-Debreu asset can be interpreted as an estimate
of the underlying event probability.
The first prediction market was the Iowa Presidential Stock Market (IPSM),
started in 1988 by researchers3 of the University of Iowa. Since then, it has be-
come the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM), the most discussed in the literature.
This interest is due to the fact that, in the case of political events, one has the
opportunity to compare markets’ results with more conventional sources such as
polls or judgement by experts. These comparisons based on two decades of re-
search show that markets have performed remarkably well, and can even be more
accurate than any other traditional tool regarding the final outcome4. However,
if there is a consensus on the performances, there are still debates regarding
the theoretical justifications5. While first papers were essentially motivated by
the existing parimutuel betting literature6, recent analyses have focused on the
specific rules of prediction markets such as the existence of an upper bound on
the amount that can be bet (Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2010), the absence of in-
terest on the funds commited to prediction market contracts (Page and Clemen,
2010), or the typical double-auction market mechanisms used to fix prices on
these markets (Serrano-Padial, 2012).
1Concerning political events, seat-share and vote-share contracts are also traded on pre-
diction markets. In this case, the payoff depends, respectively, on the number of congressional
or parliamentary seats allocated to parties in an election , or on the fraction of votes obtained
by candidates in an election.
2Hayek (1945) is a forerunner of the notion of price as a signal for information: “The
mere fact that there is one price for a commodity [...] brings about the solution which [...]
might have been arrived at by one single mind possessing all the information which is in fact
dispersed among all the people involved in the process”. However note that he never alluded
to the notion of efficiency as developed later in the literarature.
3Foresythe, Nelson, Neumann and Wright describe the IPSM mechanisms and its first
results in Anatomy of an Experimental Stock Market (1992).
4Considering the average poll error and the average market error; Berg, Foresythe, Nelson
and Rietz (2000) show that IEM outperformed polls in 9 of 15 cases between 1988 and 2000.
5For instance, see the “correspondence” between Manski (2004) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz
(2004, 2005).
6Manski (2004), Gjerstad (2005) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005).
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Overall, the first inspiration to design prediction markets is the Hayek hy-
pothesis which posits that markets can work correctly even if the participants
have very limited knowledge about their environment or about other partici-
pants, due to the informational role of prices. This claim leads to the first usual
assumption of prediction market models: the heterogeneity of beliefs among
traders. Each agent is assumed to have a limited experience with the underly-
ing event (which is an acceptable assumption for unique events such as political
elections), and thus has different opinions.
Nevertheless, an empirical regularity, the favorite-longshot bias7, tends to
weaken Hayek’s view and, ultimately, the efficient market hypotheses. This bias
is systematically observed on betting markets, and more precisely, on parimutuel
markets8. It is a striking result since parimutuel markets seem to be a more
suited setting to achieve efficiency than the traditional financial markets, as
explained by Ottaviani and Sorenson in the Handbook of Sports and Lottery
Markets (2008)9. It finally becomes puzzling when one knows that prediction
and parimutuel markets share broadly the same characteristics.
Prediction Markets and Judgement Bias
Several hypotheses have been developed to explain the favorite-longshot bias
on parimutuel markets. Among them, risk loving bettors, market power of
bookmakers or misestimation of probabilities by participants10 . Ali (1977)
provides a theoretical justification to the favorite-longshot bias solely based on
heterogeneous beliefs of traders. As seen earlier, the latter is the framework
used by the prediction market literature.
Parimutuel betting markets and prediction markets work similarly11, that
is why first theoretical research on prediction markets used similar frameworks
(Manski (2004), Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005), Gjerstad (2005)). These papers
revise Ali’s framework to study the potential extent of the favorite-longshot
bias. However they do not reach a consensus on the equilibrium price proper-
ties. While Manski (2004) shows, as Ali (1977), that prices may display a bias
with heterogeneous beliefs (i.e. prices do not reflect market’s mean belief); the
two other frameworks use different utility functions to demonstrate that prices
should actually aggregate beliefs efficiently on prediction markets.
Taking into account the specific features of prediction markets, a new strand
7There is a favorite-longshot bias when favorites (i.e. events with short odds on betting
markets) are underbet while longshots are overbet, compared to their empirical (objective)
probabilities.
8Betting markets are markets where the money bet on all outcomes is pooled and then
redistributed proportionally to winners.
9There are at least three reasons, presented in Section 2 of this paper.
10See a complete summary by Ottaviani and Sorensen in the Handbook of Sports and Lottery
Markets, chapter 6.
11Parimutuel betting is observed for horse races. In this case, the money bet on all outcomes
is pooled and then shared proportionally according to the odds among bettors who picked
the winning outcome. Replacing bets by assets and odds by prices, one basically obtains a
prediction market.
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of the literature arised with Ottaviani and Sorensen. In Aggregation of Infor-
mation and Beliefs: Asset Pricing Lesson from Prediction Markets, they offer
a new approach distinct from the parimutuel betting literature. In their anal-
ysis, agents have subjective heterogeneous prior beliefs but are also enabled to
observe an objective signal (information) correlated with the final outcome. Us-
ing a Bayesian updating process, authors show that the specific characteristics of
prediction markets prevent prices from aggregating final beliefs (after observa-
tion of the signal) properly: prices underreact to information. Ultimately, they
offer a new interpretation of the favorite-longshot bias. Their theoretical con-
clusion is still puzzling since prediction markets are used as tools to aggregate
beliefs and information, and seem to work efficiently.
However, one distinction has not appeared yet in the prediction market
litterature. While Ottaviani and Sorensen assume all traders assimilate perfectly
information before trading, empirical studies suggest a broader spectrum of
behaviors. Indeed, Foresythe et al. (1992, 2000) show evidence of the presence of
biased traders on these markets, besides what they call marginal traders. Unlike
biased traders, marginal traders are participants who do not have judgement
bias ( i.e. the case studied by Ottaviani and Sorensen). According to Foresythe
et al. (1992), the diversity of participants’ behaviors leads to efficient markets.
Their conclusion is that rational marginal traders play the role of arbitrageurs,
and “drive market prices, and therefore, predictions”.
Based on Ottaviani and Sorensen’s approach , we build a framework that
allows to account for the presence of biased traders on prediction markets and
study the consequences on the competitive equilibrium price.
In sequence, Section 2 provides a summary of the literature regarding pre-
diction markets. Section 3 presents the framework used to introduce biased
traders and displays the main results concerning the competitive equilibrium.
Then, Section 4 shows the necessary extensions of the model and Section 5
concludes. The appendix collects computations and proofs.
2 Literature Review
We differentiate two strands of the literature regarding prediction markets, the
first one being a new interpretation of the existing parimutuel betting framework
and the second, an analysis of the particular features of prediction markets and
their consequences on the aggregation of information and beliefs.
Parimutuel Betting
Since both trading process are similar, first papers on prediction markets find
support in the parimutuel betting literature12. Bets are replaced by Arrow-
Debreu assets and odds by prices on prediction markets. Parimutuel markets,
12Some papers quote Hayek to justify market’s efficiency but use static models from the
parimutuel betting literature, which may seem unadapted since the Hayek hypothesis precisely
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due to their specific features, have led to a wide empirical and theoretical liter-
ature. Indeed, as shown by Ottaviani and Sorensen (2008), these markets are
well suited to study market efficiency. First, there is a pre-specified termina-
tion point at which asset’s (bet’s) value becomes certain, whereas a security
on traditional stock market is infinitely lived, making its valuation by traders
more complex. Secondly, in contrast with usual financial markets, the realized
outcomes are exogeneous and independant of the prices and trading process on
parimutuel markets13. Finally, prices on these markets are not set by market
makers, avoiding potential mispricing.
Ali (1977) analyzes parimutuel betting over 20,247 horse races and uncov-
ers a systematic “anomaly” regarding efficiency which is the favorite-longshot
bias. Introducing bettors with heterogeneous beliefs, he retrieves this bias in a
theoretical approach.
Assume a continuum of risk neutral traders noted i with belief qi concerning
the winning of a particular horse. Assume also that beliefs are distributed ac-
cording to a continuous and strictly increasing cumulative distribution function
G(.). In parimutuel markets, the subjective or market-implied probability of an
event realization is defined by the proportion of the pool bet on it, noted m.
The objective or empirical probability in Ali (1977), is defined by the median
belief of the distribution G(.). Obviously, there is a bias when objective and
subjective probabilities are not concordant.
Intuitively, a bettor bets on an event realization when his or her own belief
qi is greater than the market probability m14. Since in Ali’s model, all bettors
wager the same amount, the proportion of bettors with a belief greater than the
market probability defines precisely the share of the total pool bet on the event
realization (i.e the market probability). Hence,
1−G(m) = m
If the median of the belief distribution (i.e. the objective probability) is
γ, then by definition
1−G(γ) = 1
2
Since G is strictly increasing we observe that:
• if m > 12 (i.e. the event is a market’s favorite), then γ > m (i.e. the
market probability is lower than the empirical probability defined by the
median belief).
• Similarly, if m < 12 (i.e. the event is a market’s longshot) then γ < m (i.e.
the market probability is greater than the empirical probability).
rests on “some prior groping process of market discovery “ and would rather suggest a dynamic
approach.
13This assumption is relaxed for prediction markets in Lieli and Nieto-Barthaburu (2009)
where an exogeneous agent can alter the event probability after observing market prices.
14One finds easily this result with a wealth-maximization program (agents are risk-neutral)
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There is a favorite-longshot bias: favorites are underbet compared to the objec-
tive probability and longshots are overbet.
Manski (2004) is the first to provide a theoretical framework for prediction
markets, relying mainly on Ali’s work. In his model, the market-implied prob-
ability becomes the price of an Arrow-Debreu asset that pays out one in case
of a particular event and zero otherwise. As in the seminal model, he shows
that prices may not reflect the market’s average belief and concludes logically
by stating that prediction markets can not be used as tools to aggregate beliefs.
Gjerstad (2005) and Wolfers and Ziztewitz (2005) respond by introducing
risk aversion in Ali’s framework. Using a logarithmic utility function15, they
show that, for any belief distribution, price is actually equal to the market’s
mean belief on prediction markets with Arrow-Debreu assets. Thus, more em-
pirical studies on prediction markets are still necessary in order to evaluate the
degree of risk aversion of traders.
For the first time, Page and Clemen (2010) introduce a time dimension in
Ali’s framework. Indeed, prediction markets are typically started several months
before the event outcome and traders receive no interest on the funds commit-
ted to prediction market contracts. Assuming time discounting preferences, it
means that a cost is induced. As a result, agents with a belief close to the
market price abstain from trading, since the cost is more likely to overcome
the expected gains. The abstention is even more pronounced for the favorites
because of their higher prices, that require a higher commitment and thus, a
larger cost due to traders’ preference for the present. Finally, authors offer a
new theoretical explanation of the favorite-longshot bias and cast doubt on the
ability of prediction markets to forecast long-term events.
Introduction of Information
Empirical studies suggest discrepancies between market-implied and empirical
probabilities and all the theoritical prediction market frameworks derived from
Ali’s work attempt to find theoretical foundations with the following methodol-
ogy: the objective probability is determined by the median or average belief and
is compared to the subjective probability defined by the asset price. However,
considering the median belief as the empirical probabilitiy in prediction market
models implies whether that:
• Traders are a representative sample of the overall population. For instance,
in the case of political elections, it would mean that traders on prediction
markets have the same presidential preferences than the total population
of voters, and in the same proportions. Empirical studies do not give
support to this claim16.
15A logarithmic utility function implies a coefficient of relative risk aversion equals to 1,
which is a typical estimate in empirical studies (for instance, Holt and Laury, 2002, Risk
Aversion and Incentive Effects).
16See Foresythe et al. (1992, 2000).
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• Traders have access to objective information about the outcome and up-
date their beliefs. In this case it would mean that prices, by aggregating
updated beliefs, contain information about the final outcomes. Then, ra-
tional traders as in Ali’s model, should be able to extract information from
the price and modify their demand. It is actually an outcome from the cri-
tique of the Walrasian approach to the price formation with heterogeneous
beliefs presented by Grossman (1989).
The latter remark is the cornerstone of Ottaviani and Sorensen’s framework.
Contrary to previous papers, they introduce explicitly information in their
framework with a signal. Then they assume a bayesian update of beliefs and
analyze how price aggregates these final beliefs. They do not define an ad hoc
endogeneous objective probability, but rather study how price is related with
the exogenous information observed by traders. Therefore, they depart them-
selves from Ali’s model and become immune to the critique mentioned above.
One of the main conclusions is that, even if all traders observe the same signal
and agree on its interpretation, the price underreacts to information (i.e. the
price fails to aggregate properly final beliefs).
Their result relies partly on a particular feature of prediction markets which
is the upper bound on the amount that can be invested17, which generates a
wealth effect. Associated with heterogeneous prior beliefs and access to infor-
mation, authors show that markets can not be perfectly efficient. These three
“ingredients” (heterogeneous prior beliefs, information and wealth effect) are
necessary to the underreaction result.
Indeed, Varian (1985) already combined heterogeneous beliefs and informa-
tion but did not introduce a wealth effect. Likewise, Ottaviani and Sorensen
show with an extension of a classical Rubinstein’s (1974) result that access to
information and wealth effect, with a common prior, do not necesarily lead to
underreaction. The third possibility, namely, heterogeneous beliefs and wealth
effect without information, is Ali’s case with its weaknesses presented above.
Biased Traders
Note that traders are assumed perfectly rational in Ottaviani and Sorensen’s
framework. It means traders agree on the interpretation of information and
update their beliefs in a Bayesian rational way. Forsythe et al. (1992), thanks
to individual data of IEM, show that a majority of traders18 are actually subject
to numerous judgement bias that prevent them to interpret information in a
Bayesian way. Still, theoretical prediction market frameworks do not account
for different types of traders19. To our knowledge, only Serrano-Padial (2012)
considered a similar case with naive and sophisticated traders (but in a double-
auction market), and eventually displayed a favorite-longshot bias. Hereafter,
17For instance, traders on IEM are authorized to wager up to $500.
18Forsythe et al. (1992), with specific criteria, exhibit only 22 marginal (rational) traders
out of 192 participants on the 1988 US presidential election market of the IEM
19Studies of traditional financial markets have already accounted for biased traders. See for
instance Lam, Liu and Wong (2009) for pseudo-bayesian traders.
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using Ottaviani and Sorensen’s model, we build a framework that allows for
the introduction of biased traders and derive the Walrasian equlibrium price
properties.
3 The Framework20
Prediction Market
Following Ottaviani and Sorensen, we consider a binary prediction market in
which traders can take positions on the realization of an event E, or on the
complementary event Ec. There are two Arrow-Debreu assets in this market:
• One asset that pays out 1 currency unit if event E is realized, 0 otherwise.
• One asset that pays out 1 currency unit if event Ec is realized, 0 otherwise.
The total supply of each asset is normalized to 1.
Trader i enters the market by obtaining an equal number of both assets, wi0
units. This is a particular feature of the IEM that ensures a zero-sum game21.
Participants have an upper bound on the amount they are allowed to invest on
this market and are not authorized to hold a negative number of asset (no “short
sales”). We normalize the sum of the two prices to one. Hereafter, we focus on
the price p of the asset paying in event E, since the other case is symmetrical.
Traders
We assume heterogeneous beliefs among participants regarding the realization
of event E. Therefore, traders have at first different subjective prior beliefs qi.
Unlike previous frameworks, Ottaviani and Sorensen’s model introduces ex-
plicitly objective information through the observation of a public signal s by
each participant before trading. Density of the signal conditional to the state
ω ∈ {E,Ec} is f(s | ω). Thus, the likelihood ratio for signal realization is defined
by L(s) = f(s|E)f(s|Ec) . The signal is never fully state-revealing, then L(s) ∈ (0,∞).
Obviously, a signal realization s in favor of event E (resp. Ec) has a likelihood
ratio greater than 1 (resp. lower than 1). The observation of the signal leads
each trader to update his or her prior belief qi to a subjective posterior belief
ui. The key point of the paper is to determine a suitable updating rule of beliefs.
We assume a continuum of risk-neutral traders that maximize their expected
wealth uiwi(E)+ (1−ui)wi(Ec) where wi(E) is the quantity of asset that pays
out in E (resp. Ec) eventually held.
In order to define an aggregate demand in the following, the initial distri-
bution of assets over individuals is represented by the cumulative distribution
20Troughout the remaining, “*” sends the reader to the appendix
21As specified in its rules, the IEM do not make profits or losses, since these markets are
designed for educational purposes only
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function F where F (q) is the initial share of assets held by all traders with a
belief lower than q. F is assumed to be continuous and strictly increasing on
the interval where F /∈ {0, 1}
3.1 Determination of Posterior Beliefs
3.1.1 Bayesian Updating Rule
In the seminal model, all traders agree on the interpretation of the signal and up-
date in a Bayesian rational way. Thus, according to Bayes’ rule, their posterior
belief is defined by:
pii
1− pii =
qi
1− qiL(s) (1)
where pii is the subjective posterior belief with a bayesian updating rule.
3.1.2 Alternative Updating Rule
Empirical studies on prediction markets suggest various behaviors regarding the
interpretation of information. In the first analysis of the IEM, Foresythe et al.
(1992) highlight the existence of biased traders and discuss the potential nature
of the bias by using arguments from both psychologists and political scientists.
The first bias documented is the assimilation-contrast effect22 that states
that “an individual’s preference for an outcome biases his or her interpretation
of information about the likelihood of the outcome occuring”. The second bias
mentioned is called the false-consensus effect23 and posits that traders “tend
to overestimate the extent to which their views are representative of the popu-
lation”24. Both effects show the importance of prior belief in traders’ estimates
of the event’s probability.
We account for this facts by using an updating rule distinct from the bayesian
one. Assume posterior beliefs are then defined by:
δi(L) = (1− α)pii(L) + αqi
where α ∈ (0, 1) is constant among traders and where δi is the subjective
posterior belief with this different update rule. Note that, by definition, δi ∈
(min(qi,pii),max(qi,pii)).
Independently of the prediction market literature, Epstein, Noor and San-
droni (2009) present this alternative to the bayesian benchmark, based on the
22Literature mentioned by the original paper: Sherif and Hovland, Social Judgement: As-
similation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change (1961); Parducci and
Marshall, Assimilation vs. Contrast in the Anchoring of Perceptual Judgements of Weights
(1962).
23Literature mentioned by the original paper: Ross et al., The False Consensus Effect: An
Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes (1977) and Brown, A False
Consensus Bias in 1980 Presidential Preferences (1982).
24Both quotations in this paragraph are from Foresythe et al. (1992)
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work of behavioral economists 25. They also rely on the idea that Bayesian up-
dating rules may be costly so that, even if agents would prefer to be bayesian,
they may use simpler non-bayesian updates. With this updating rule, individu-
als place excessive weights on prior beliefs and underreact to new information,
in line with the two bias mentioned above. We turn now to the determination
of the equilibrium price.
3.2 Competitive Equilibrium Price With Non Bayesian
Agents
In this section, we provide the main steps leading to the determination of the
equilibrium price p of the E asset.
First, we need to define risk neutral traders’ demand for each asset. Assume
participants observe a signal realization with likelihood L that leads to different
updated beliefs ui ∈ {pii, δi}. Since we assume risk neutrality, agents either buy
only E assets or Ec assets. The subjective expected return on one E asset at a
price p is defined by:
ui(1− p)− (1− ui)p = ui − p
Similarly, the expected return of one Ec asset is (1−ui)p−ui(1−p) = p−ui26.
Thus:
• if ui > p, traders exchange their entire endowment of the Ec asset at price
1− p in order to buy wi0(1−p)p units of the E asset. Their final portfolio is
then wi0p units of the E asset and 0 unit of the E
c asset.
• Conversely, if ui < p, agents exchange their entire endowment of the E
asset to buy the Ec asset. Their final portfolio becomes wi01−p units of the
Ec asset and 0 unit of the E asset.
• In the specific case ui = p, individuals are indifferent between any trade.
Considering Bayesian updates, Ottaviani and Sorensen show that the equi-
librium price is the unique solution to the equation:
p = 1−G
(
p
(1− p)L+ p
)
(2)
and is strictly increasing in L.
Hereafter, we provide a solution for the updating rule leading to the posterior
belief ui = δi (alternative non-bayesian update).
25For instance, Kahneman and Tversky (1974), Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics
and biases, Science 185
26Remember that the price of the Ec asset is 1− p
11
Equilibrium Price
For a given likelihood ratio L, we have δi = (1 − α)pii + αqi. From (1), one
shows that pii = qiL(L−1)qi+1 . We rewrite:
δi = (1− α) qiL(L− 1)qi + 1 + αqi
Agents buy the E asset if δi > p or similarly:
(1− α) qiL
(L− 1)qi + 1 + αqi > p
This inequation becomes:
q2i (α(L− 1)) + qi [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]− p > 0
We need to infer from this inequation the threshold value q∗(L, p,α) above
which traders would buy the E asset. Note that setting α = 0, one obviously
retrieves the threshold defined by the original paper with bayesian updates.
Computations* provide the following result:
q∗(L, p,α) =
q
[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]2 + 4α(L− 1)p− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]
2α(L− 1) (3)
Therefore, for a given L and α, every trader with a posterior belief δi > p, or
equivalently qi > q∗, demands the E asset in amount wi0p . Using the cumulative
distribution function, the aggregate demand becomes:
1− F (q∗)
p
where 1−F (q∗) represents the total initial asset endowment of participants
with a prior belief qi > q∗. Aggregate supply in our framework is equal to 1.
Thus, at equilibrium:
1− F (q∗)
p
= 1
Finally, the competitive equilibrium price is defined by the following equation:
p = 1− F (q∗)
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Proposition 1* For L %= 1, the competitive equilibrium price, p, with non
bayesian traders is the unique solution to the equation
p = 1− F

√
[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]2 + 4α(L− 1)p− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]
2α(L− 1)

and is a strictly increasing function of the information realization L and a
strictly decreasing function of α.
3.3 Underreaction of Price to Information
One of the main achievements of the original framework is to exhibit an under-
reaction of the price to new information compared to the bayesian reaction of
traders’ beliefs. Even if participants update according to Bayes’ rule and inter-
pret the information in the same way (i.e. agree on the conditional density of
the signal f(s | ω)), price does not reflect this agreement. Then, in contradiction
with the Arrow-Debreu assets literature, market’s expectations and price differ.
Ultimately, authors provide a new explanation for market inefficiencies such as
the favorite-longshot bias without relying on an ad hoc definition of the event’s
objective/empirical probability
3.3.1 Underreaction of Price with Bayesian Updates
Authors illustrate underreaction in their framework with the following example.
Assume traders observe a public signal that delivers information more favorable
to event E (i.e. an increase in L). According to (2), price of the E asset, p, is
higher when L increases. It implies that traders willing to purchase the E asset
can buy fewer units since the bound wi0p is decreasing in p, there is a wealth
effect. Conversely, traders who wish to buy the Ec asset at price 1− p purchase
more units. Therefore, with a higher L, optimists about the event E buy less,
while pessimists (who sell the E asset) sell more. As a result, if all traders
who were buying the E asset before the increase in L were still purchasing the
same asset after observation of the signal, there would be an insufficient demand
for E. Equivalently, there would be an excess demand for the Ec asset. For
the market to clear, some pessimistic traders must move to the optimistic side.
Then the marginal trader that determines the price holds a pessimistic belief
about the event realization. Due to this negative effect, the price moves slower
than posterior beliefs of traders.
It is a puzzling result since these markets are precisely designed to aggregate
information and beliefs.
Formally, for two different information realizations L and L′ > L, Ottaviani
and Sorensen displays the underreaction of price according to the following
equation27:
27The proof provided in the original paper
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log
(
pi(L′)
1− pi(L′)
)
− log
(
pi(L)
1− pi(L)
)
> log
(
p(L′)
1− p(L′)
)
− log
(
p(L)
1− p(L)
)
(4)
In our framework, the logarithm transformation of the function δ(L)1−δ(L) do
not allow to conclude regarding underreaction of price, hence we move from a
discrete time to a continuous time setting.
3.3.2 Reaction of Price with Non Bayesian Updates
Hereafter, in order to simplify computations, we consider the specific case of a
uniform distribution of initial endowments, i.e. F (q∗) = q∗. Thus the competi-
tive equilibrium price equation given by Proposition 1 becomes:
p = 1− q∗
where q∗ =
√
[L+(α+p)(1−L)]2+4α(L−1)p−[L+(α+p)(1−L)]
2α(L−1)
Proposition 2* If we assume a uniform distribution, the competitive equilib-
rium price implicitly defined by Proposition 1 is:
p =
α(L− 1) + 2L−
√
[α(1− L)− 2L]2 − 4L(L− 1)(1 + α)
2(L− 1)(1 + α)
Underreaction
We want to verify if underreaction, as defined by (3), also occurs with non-
bayesian traders. Observe that (3) is true for any L′ > L. Then we define
L′ = L+ dL with dL > 0. We rewrite (3):
log
(
δ(L+dL)
1−δ(L+dL)
)
− log
(
δ(L)
1−δ(L)
)
L+ dL− L >
log
(
p(L+dL)
1−p(L+dL)
)
− log
(
p(L)
1−p(L)
)
L+ dL− L
Taking the limits, one obtains:
lim
dL→0+
log
(
δ(L+dL)
1−δ(L+dL)
)
− log
(
δ(L)
1−δ(L)
)
dL
> lim
dL→0+
log
(
p(L+dL)
1−p(L+dL)
)
− log
(
p(L)
1−p(L)
)
dL
which is equivalent to:
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∂log
(
δ(L)
1−δ(L)
)
∂L
>
∂log
(
p(L)
1−p(L)
)
∂L
it leads to:
∂( δ(L)1−δ(L))
∂L
δ(L)
1−δ(L)
>
∂( p(L)1−p(L))
∂L
p(L)
1−p(L)
meaning that if the growth rate of δ(L)1−δ(L) is greater than the growth rate of
p(L)
1−p(L) , there is an underreaction of price to information.
One can also show easily that
∂log( δ(L)1−δ(L))
∂L =
∂δ(L)
∂L
pi(L)(1−(L)) and
∂log( p(L)1−p(L))
∂L =
∂p(L)
∂L
p(L)(1−p(L)) , which leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3* For every L > 0, Ottaviani and Sorensen’s underreaction of
price is also defined in continous time by the inequality:
∂δ(L)
∂L
∂p(L)
∂L
>
δ(L)(1− δ(L))
p(L)(1− p(L))
With non bayesian updates and a uniform distribution of initial wealth, this
inequality does not hold; meaning that underreaction of price, as defined in
Ottaviani and Sorensen’s framework, is not confirmed. The price does not nec-
essarily underreact to the interpretation of information made by non-bayesian
traders.
4 Extensions
Different Updating Rules
We have presented a framework that allows for the introduction of traders who
are not perfectly rational since they do not update in a Bayesian rational way
after observing a public signal. However, the competitive equilibrium derived
account for a constant α > 0, meaning that all traders underreact in the same
way to the signal. The next step would be to introduce agents with different
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updating rules αi. Nevertheless, several issues must be solved before deriving
the equilibrium.
First, the introduction of traders’ dependent updating rules implies to define
a new distribution function. For instance P (q,α) would be the initial cross-
sectional distribution of beliefs and updating rules. A first step to solve the
model would be to determine whether prior beliefs and updating rules are sta-
tistically independent. Empirical studies are needed to see how traders interpret
information depending on the value of their prior beliefs.
A way to avoid this issue would be to assume a common prior belief and
the following updating rule:
δi = (1− αi)pi + αiq
But then all beliefs belong to the narrow interval: [min(q,pi),max(q,pi)]
Secondly, it is shown empirically in the financial literature that investors pay
too much attention to extreme information28, meaning that the updating rule
may also depend on the quality of information.
Dynamic Model
In Ottaviani and Sorensen’s framework, the model and rationality of traders are
common knowledge. Thus, all the information is revealed at the equilibrium (i.e.
p(L) is injective). Therefore, in the dynamic setting, there is no exchange when
information appears after the initial round of trade; as suggested by the no trade
theorem demonstrated by Milgrom and Stokey (1982). One possibility to bypass
the no trade theorem in our framework is to assume time-variant updating rule.
Lam, Liu and Wong (2009) present, for a traditional stock market, a pseudo-
bayesian approach with time-variant weights on the information. Under this
consideration, they can model two typical behavioral biases observed on tradi-
tional financial markets: traders’ usage of conservatism heuristics (underreaction
to information) or representativeness heuristics (overreaction to information).
5 Conclusion
Empirical studies suggest the presence of at least two types of traders on predic-
tion markets: rational/marginal traders and biased traders. Based on Ottaviani
and Sorensen’s framework, we build a prediction market model that allows to
introduce non-bayesian traders. In this case, we show that equilibrium price
properties differ from the seminal model ones. In particular, we cannot as-
certain that price underreacts to the interpretation of information made by
biased-traders. In order to exhibit new price patterns, the next step would be
to allow for different type of traders (biased/unbiased) and a dynamic setting.
28Griffin and Tversky (1992) in “The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confi-
dence”, Cognitive Psychology, 24, 411–435.
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6 Appendix
We provide the main steps of the computations that led to the different propo-
sitions
Determination of the threshold q∗
• For the case L = 1, the solution is straighforward, using (2) we have
q∗ = p, as in Ottaviani and Sorensen. Then one has an equilibrium price
defined by the equation p = 1− F (p)
• For the case L %= 1, we can compute the threshold value of qi by rewritting:
q2i (α(L− 1)) + qi [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]− p = 0 (5)
We recognize a quadratic function of qi with discriminant ∆ such that:
∆ =[ L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]2 + 4α(L− 1)p
To determine the sign of this discriminant, we rewrite:
∆ = [1− (α+ p)]2 L2 + 2 [α(1− α) + p(1− p)]L+ (α− p)2 (6)
For α+ p = 1, it can be shown that ∆ > 0
When α+p %= 1, it is a new quadratic function of L with a new discriminant
∆∆ defined by:
∆∆ = 4 [α(1− α) + p(1− p)]2 − 4 [1− (α+ p)]2 (α− p)2
∆∆ is positive if:
| α− α2 + p− p2 |>| 1− (α+ p) || α− p |
One shows this inequality holds for p ∈ (0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1). Then ∆∆ > 0
under these conditions. Thus, we derive two roots:
L1 =
− [α(1− α) + p(1− p)]−√∆∆
[1− (α+ p)]2
L2 =
− [α(1− α) + p(1− p)] +√∆∆
[1− (α+ p)]2
It can be shown that L1 < 0 and L2 < 0
We proceed to a simple graphic interpretation to determine the sign of ∆.
First, observe that the coefficient of L2 in (5) is [1− (α+ p)]2 wich is positive
under our asumption α + p %= 1. It means ∆ is a parabola that opens upward.
Second, for L = 0, ∆ value is (α − p)2 ≥ 0. We can conclude that, for any
L ∈ (0,∞), ∆ > 0 when α+ p %= 1 (see Figure 1).
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Therefore, for both cases α+ p = 1 and α+ p %= 1, we define 2 solutions q1i
and q2i of (3):
q1i =
−[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]−√∆
2α(L− 1)
q2i =
−[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)] +√∆
2α(L− 1)
The solution must satisfy 0 < q∗ < 1. We have to distinguish 2 cases: L < 1
and L > 1. We provide a summary of the different signs of qi depending on the
value of L (all the computations to find the differents results presented in the
table are not written here):
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L<1 L>1
−[(L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]−√∆ < 0 −[(L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]−√∆ < 0
2α(L− 1) < 0 2α(L− 1) > 0
q1i > 1 q
1
i < 0
−[(L+ (α+ p)(1− L)] +√∆ < 0 −[(L+ (α+ p)(1− L)] +√∆ < 0
2α(L− 1) < 0 2α(L− 1) > 0
0 < q2i < 1 0 < q
2
i < 1
Thus, the only threshold value of qi for any L ∈ (0,∞) is (1).
Proof of Proposition 1
We only provide here a proof for the case L > 1.
Price is defined implicitly by Proposition 1. Note that the left hand side is
strictly increasing with p and, naturally, is equal to 0 when p = 0 and 1 when
p = 1. For the right hand side, one can easily show that, for any α, q∗ = 0 with
p = 0 and q∗ = 1 with p = 1. Then 1− F (q∗) = 1 in p = 0 and 1− F (q∗) = 0
in p = 1. Then, let’s study:
.
∂q∗
∂p
=
1
2α(L− 1)
{
[2(1− L)[L+ (α+ p)(1− L) + 4α(L− 1)] 1
2
√
∆
− (1− L)
}
We focus on the sign of the expression in brackets:
(1− L)[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)− 2α(1− L)] 1√
∆
− (1− L)
⇔ (1− L)
[
L+ (α+ p)(1− L)− 2α−√∆√
∆
]
which is positive, using the fact that q∗ > 0, L+ (α+ p)(1−L)− 2α−√∆ < 0
when L > 1. Thus:
∂q∗
∂p
=
(1− L)
[
L+(α+p)(1−L)−2α−√∆√
∆
]
2α(L− 1) > 0
Since the function F is strictly increasing, the right hand side is strictly de-
creasing in p while the left hand side is strictly increasing. Thus the compet-
itive equilibrium price defined implicitly by Proposition 1 is unique.
Next, we prove that the equilibrium price defined implicitly by Proposition 1
is an increasing function of L, i.e. when traders have more information favorable
to event E, the price of the E asset increase.
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Observe that when L rises, the left hand side of the equilibrium price equa-
tion is unaffected. Concerning the right hand side, let’s compute:
∂q∗
∂L
=
n
1
2 [2(1− (α+ p))[L+ (α+ p)(1− L) + 4αp] 1√∆ − [1− (α+ p)]
o
2α(L− 1)−
n√
∆− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]
o
2α
[2α(L− 1)]2
⇔ ∂q∗
∂L
=
n
[(1− (α+ p))[L+ (α+ p)(1− L) + 2αp] 1√
∆
− [1− (α+ p)]
o
2α(L− 1)−
n√
∆− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]
o
2α
[2α(L− 1)]2
Let’s study the numerator:
2α

(L− 1)(1− (α+ p))[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]√
∆
+
2αp(L− 1)√
∆
− [1− (α+ p)](L− 1)−√∆+[ L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]
ff
⇔ 2α
(
(L− 1)(1− (α+ p))[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)] + 2αp(L− 1)− [1− (α+ p)](L− 1)√∆−∆+√∆[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]√
∆
)
Let’s study the numerator:
(L−1)(1−(α+p))[L+(α+p)(1−L)]+2αp(L−1)−∆+√∆ [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)− {L− 1− (αL− α+ pL− p)}]
⇔ (L−1)(1−(α+p))[L+(α+p)(1−L)]+2αp(L−1)−[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]2−4α(L−1)p+√∆
⇔ (L−1)(1−(α+p))[L+(α+p)(1−L)]−2αp(L−1)−[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]2+√∆
⇔ [(L− 1)(1− (α+ p))− L− (α− Lα+ p− pL)] [L+(α+p)(1−L)]−2αp(L−1)+√∆
⇔ √∆− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]− 2αp(L− 1)
So finally:
∂q∗
∂L
=
2α
[√
∆−[L+(α+p)(1−L]−2αp(L−1)√
∆
]
[2α(L− 1)]2
Let’s study the sign of this expression by studying the sign of√
∆− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]− 2αp(L− 1). We have:
√
∆− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]− 2αp(L− 1) > 0
⇔ √∆− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)] > 2αp(L− 1)
since L > 1, we have
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p <
√
∆− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]
2α(L− 1)
Or equivalently:
p < q∗
Simulations show q∗ < p for any L > 1
Then:
∂q∗
∂L
< 0
Since F is a strictly increasing function , when L rises, the right hand side
is strictly increasing. Ultimately, the equilibrium price is an increasing
function of L.
Finally, we study the derivative of q∗ with respect to α:
∂q∗
∂α
=
n
1
2 [2(1− L)[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)] + 4(L− 1)p] 1√∆ − (1− L)
o
2α(L− 1)−
h√
∆− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)
i
2(L− 1)
[2α(L− 1)]2
We study the numerator:

[(1− L)[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)] + 2(L− 1)p] 1√
∆
− (1− L)
ff
2α(L−1)−
h√
∆− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)
i
2(L−1)
⇔ 2(L−1)

α(1− L)(L+ (α+ p)(1− L)√
∆
+
α2(L− 1)p√
∆
− α(1− L)
ff
−
h√
∆− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)
i
2(L−1)
⇔ 2(L−1)
(
α(1− L)(L+ (α+ p)(1− L) + 2α(L− 1)p− α(1− L)√∆−∆+√∆[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)√
∆
)
Let’s compute:
α(1−L)(L+(α+p)(1−L)+2α(L−1)p−α(1−L)√∆−∆+√∆[L+(α+p)(1−L)
⇔ √∆ [L+ p(1− L)]−2α(L−1)p+[L+(α+p)(1−L)][α(1−L)−L−(α+p)(1−L)]
⇔ [L+ p(1− L)]
[√
∆− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]
]
− 2α(L− 1)p
We have:
[L+ p(1− L)]
[√
∆− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]
]
− 2α(L− 1)p > 0
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⇔ p < [L+ p(1− L)] q∗
Simulations show this inequation holds.
Finally:
∂q∗
∂α
=
2(L− 1)
{
[L+p(1−L)][
√
∆−[L+(α+p)(1−L)]]−2α(L−1)p√
∆
}
[2α(L− 1)]2 > 0
Since F is a strictly increasing function , when α rises, the right hand side is
strictly decreasing. Hence, the equilibrium price is a decreasing function
of α.
Proof of Proposition 2
Assuming a uniform distribution of initial endowments, we derive the equilib-
rium price from Proposition 1
p = 1−
√
∆− [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]
2α(L− 1)
⇔ (p− 1)2α(L− 1) = −√∆+ L+ (α+ p)(1− L)
⇔ [(1− p)2α(L− 1) + L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]2 = ∆
By developing the LHS and replacing the RHS by (4), one gets:
[(1− p)2α(L− 1)]2+2(1−p)2α(L−1) [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]+[L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]2 = [L+ (α+ p)(1− L)]2+4α(L−1)p
One eventually finds:
4α(L− 1) [p2(L− 1)(1 + α) + p[α(1− L)− 2L] + L] = 0
which is equivalent to p2(L− 1)(1 + α) + p[α(1− L)− 2L] + L = 0
We recognize once again a quadratic equation with discriminant:
∆ =[ α(1− L)− 2L]2 − 4L(L− 1)(1 + α)
Using simulations, we show this discriminant is positive. Then we define two
solutions for the price:
p1 =
2L+ α(L− 1)−√∆
2(L− 1)(1 + α)
p2 =
2L+ α(L− 1)+√∆
2(L− 1)(1 + α)
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One can show that p2 > 1 while 0 < p1 < 1, then the competitive equilibrium
price in case of a uniform distribution of initial endowments is
p =
2L+ α(L− 1)−√∆
2(L− 1)(1 + α)
Proof of Proposition 3
Using simulations with a uniform distribution of initial wealth, we find cases
where the underreaction inequation does not hold.
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